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Abstract
We formalize an allocation model under ordinal preferences
that is more general than the well-studied Shapley-Scarf
housing market. In our model, the agents do not just care
which house or resource they get but also care about who
gets their own resource. This assumption is especially impor-
tant when considering temporary exchanges in which each
resource is eventually returned to the owner. We show that
several positive axiomatic and computational results that hold
for housing markets do not extend to the more general set-
ting. We then identify natural restrictions on the preferences
of agents for which several positive results do hold. One of
our central results is a general class of algorithms that return
any allocation that is individually rational and Pareto optimal
with respect to the responsive set extension.
Introduction
The Shapley-Scarf housing market is a well-studied formal
model for barter markets where the goods can be dormitory
rooms or kidneys (So¨nmez and U¨nver 2011). In the market,
each agent owns a single good referred to as a house. The
goal is to redistribute the houses to the agents in the most
desirable fashion. Shapley and Scarf (1974) showed that
under strict preferences, a simple yet elegant mechanism
called Gale’s Top Trading Cycle (TTC) is polynomial-time,
strategyproof and find an allocation that is Pareto optimal
and core stable. Even if the preferences are not strict, the
algorithm can be suitably generalized while not losing any
of the properties (see e.g., (Alcalde-Unzu and Molis 2011;
Aziz and de Keijzer 2012; Saban and Sethuraman 2013;
Jaramillo and Manjunath 2012)). There has also
been work where agents have multi-unit demand
and endowments (Sonoda et al. 2014; Papai 2007;
Konishi et al. 2001). In this paper we focus on single-
unit demands.
In the Shapley-Scarf market, agents only have preferences
over houses. This is a reasonable assumption especially
when the exchange is irrevocable. However, if the exchange
is temporary, and the original house of an agent will be re-
turned to her, the agent may care as to who temporarily used
her house. In order to capture this additional issue, we con-
sider the temporary exchange problem that is a generalisa-
tion of the Shapley-Scarf housing market. In this general-
isation, an agent has preferences over outcomes that take
into account both what house the agent gets and also who
gets her own house. The assumption of the temporary ex-
change also makes sense when for example a kidney patient
not only cares about getting a suitable kidney but also has
preference over who should get his or her donor’s kidney.
The setting also applies to reinsurance markets in which the
identity of the insurers affects the preferences over arrange-
ments. For this more general setting, we want to study fun-
damental questions as follows: does a core stable allocation
exist and what is the complexity of finding it? What is the
complexity of finding a Pareto optimal allocation?
Contributions We formulate an exchange market setting
that is more general than the well-studied Shapley-Scarf
market. It models several scenarios where agents are per-
forming a temporary exchange or they care about who gets
their resource.
We first focus on core allocations in such settings and
show that the core can be empty and it is NP-hard to check
whether a core stable allocation exists. We also prove that
finding a Pareto optimal allocation is NP-hard and test-
ing Pareto optimality and weak Pareto optimality is coNP-
complete.
We complement the computational hardness results by
presenting succinct ILP and quadratic programming formu-
lations for finding a Pareto optimal allocation. We then
consider a weakening of Pareto optimality called Pareto
optimality with respect to the responsive set extension.
For this particular concept, we propose a general class of
polynomial-time algorithms that return any allocation that is
individually rational and Pareto optimal with respect to the
responsive set extension.
We also consider strategic aspects and present two key
impossibility results. Firstly, there exists no core-consistent
and strategyproof mechanism. Secondly, there exists no in-
dividually rational, Pareto optimal, and strategyproof mech-
anism. We then identify restrictions on the preferences in
particular house-predominant and tenant-predominant pref-
erences under which we regain the positive axiomatic and
computational results that hold for the Shapley-Scarf mar-
ket.
Temporary Exchange Problem
An instance of Temporary Exchange Problem is a tuple
(N,H, e,%)
where
• N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of agents.
• H = {h1, . . . , hn} is the set of houses.
• Endowment function e : N 7→ H maps each agent to a
house. Each agent i owns exactly one house e(i). We will
denote
⋃
i∈S e(i) by e(S ).
• %= (%1, . . . ,%n) is the preference profile that specifies for
each agent i ∈ N, the weak order preference relation %i
over N × H.∗ The symbol %i denotes “prefer at least as
much”, ≻i denotes “strictly more prefer”, and ∼i denotes
indifference.
A feasible outcome for the setting is an allocation of the
houses to the agents. An allocation is a one-to-one mapping
from N to H. If p is the allocation, we will denote by p(i) as
the house agent i gets. We will denote by p−1(h) the agent
who gets house h.
Each agent cares about the combination of two things:
which house she gets and who gets her own house. We will
refer to this combination as the outcome for the agent.
For an agent i, the outcome (e(k), j) represents the sce-
nario where i gets house e(k) and gives house e(i) to agent j.
For an agent i, the outcome (e(i), i) represents the situation
where i keeps her own house. The outcome (e( j), j) repre-
sents the situation where i swaps her house with j. When we
write that (e( j), k) ≻i (hℓ,m), it means that i prefers outcome
(e( j), k) to (hℓ,m).
Therefore for any allocations p and q, an agent compares
them only from the point of view of what house she gets
and who gets her house: p %i q ⇐⇒ (p(i), p
−1(e(i))) %i
(q(i), q−1(e(i))). Note that an agent i will be interested in
the outcome (h j, k) only if is it more preferred by her than
(e(i), i). Otherwise agent i would rather not be part of the
exchange. Note that there could be multiple allocation for
which the outcome for an agent is the same.
Properties of allocations and mechanisms
We consider the standard properties in market design: (i)
Pareto optimality: there should be no allocation in which
each agent is at least as happy and at least one agent is
strictly happier (ii) individual rationality (IR): no agent
should have an incentive to leave the allocation program (iii)
strategyproofness: no agent should have an incentive to mis-
report her preferences; and (iv) core stability: an allocation
should be such that no set of agents can form a coalition
where they just exchange among themselves to get a better
outcome than the the allocation. We define these properties
as follows.
An allocation p is Pareto optimal if there exists no other
allocation q such that q %i p for all i ∈ N and q ≻i p for
∗Note that in the standard housing market, the preferences are
simply over the set of houses. Our model allows for more complex
preferences.
some i ∈ N. An allocation p is weakly Pareto optimal if
there exists no other allocation q such that q ≻i p for all
i ∈ N.
An allocation p is individually rational if
(p(i), p−1(e(i))) %i (i, e(i)).
A coalition S ⊆ N blocks an allocation p on N if there
exists an allocation q on S such that for all i ∈ S , it is the
case that q(i) ∈ e(S ) and q(i) ≻i p(i). An allocation is core
stable if it admits no blocking coalition.
A allocation algorithm is strategyproof if no agent can
misreport and get a better outcome.
Core stability
We first show that unlike the Shapley-Scarf housing market,
the Temporary Exchangemarket may not admit a core stable
allocation.
Proposition 1 The core of a Temporary Exchange setting
instance can be empty.
Proof: Consider an instance where
• N = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}
• H = {h0, . . . , h4}
• e(i) = hi for all i ∈ {0, . . . , 4}
• The preferences are as follows.
1 : (h2, 2), (h0, 0), (h1, 1)
2 : (h3, 3), (h1, 1), (h2, 2)
3 : (h4, 4), (h2, 2), (h3, 3)
4 : (h0, 0), (h3, 3), (h4, 4)
0 : (h1, 1), (h4, 4), (h0, 0)
Our first claim is that for an allocation to be individually
rational, it must be that an agent i makes no exchange or
she makes a pairwise exchange with agent (i + 1 mod 5)
or agent (i − 1 mod 5). An agent i is only interested in
outcomes (h(i+1 mod 5), (i + 1 mod 5)) or (h(i−1 mod 5), (i − 1
mod 5)) or (hi, i). Suppose i gets a house different than hi.
Then she gets either h(i+1 mod 5) or h(i−1 mod 5). Suppose that
agent i gets house h(i+1 mod 5). Then the outcome is only
acceptable to i only if (i+1 mod 5) gets house hi. Similarly,
if agent i gets house h(i−1 mod 5), then the outcome is only
acceptable to i only if (i − 1 mod 5) gets house hi.
Now consider any individually rational allocation. From
the claim established it follows that the allocation involves
zero or more pairwise exchanges. Since there are an odd
number of agents, at least one agent will not be part of
any exchange. Let such as agent be j. Note that j is in-
terested to make an pairwise exchange with j − 1. Agent
j − 1 also prefers outcome (h j, j) over (h( j−2 mod 5), ( j − 2
mod 5)) or (h( j−1 mod 5), ( j − 1 mod 5)). Hence agents in
{( j − 1 mod 5), j} form a blocking coalition. 
Next, we show that it is NP-hard to check whether a core
stable allocation exists. The proof uses the example in the
proof of Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 Checking whether there exists a core stable
allocation is NP-hard if there are indifferences in the prefer-
ences and even if each agent has at most 6 acceptable out-
come pairs.
Proof: We reduce from the following NP-complete prob-
lem.
Name: ExactCoverBy3Sets (X3C):
Instance: A pair (R, S ), where R is a set and S is a collec-
tion of subsets of R such that |R| = 3m for some positive
integer m and |s| = 3 for each s ∈ S and each element in R
appears three times in S .
Question: Is there a sub-collection S ′ ⊆ S that is a partition
of R?
For each integer j ∈ R, we have a corresponding gadget
instance j where N j = {0 j, 1 j, 2 j, 3 j, 4 j}; H j = {h
j
0
, . . . , h
j
4
};
e(i j) = h
j
i
for all i ∈ {0, . . . , 4} The preferences are as fol-
lows.
1 j : (h
j
2
, 2 j), (h
j
0
, 0 j), (h
j
1
, 1 j)
2 j : (h
j
3
, 3 j), (h
j
1
, 1 j), (h
j
2
, 2 j)
3 j : (h
j
4
, 4 j), (h
j
2
, 2 j), (h
j
3
, 3 j)
4 j : (h
j
0
, 0 j), (h
j
3
, 3 j), (h
j
4
, 4 j)
0 j : {(e(0k), 0i) : {i, j, k} ∈ S }, (h
j
1
, 1 j), (h
j
4
, 4 j), (h
j
0
, 0 j)
Note that agent 0 j is interested to perform exchanges with
other agents 0i and 0k from other gadgets.
The overall allocation instance involves agents and houses
from all the gadgets so that N =
⋃
N j and H = H j.
We claim that there exists a core stable allocation if and
only if we have a yes instance of X3C. If we have a no in-
stance of X3C, not every 0 j agent can form an exchange
with other zero type agents so we have core deviation within
gadget j such as had in the proof of Proposition 1. Suppose
we have a yes instance of X3C. In that case there is a parti-
tion of agents in {0 j} who all get one of their most preferred
outcomes. 
Pareto optimality
We now turn to the problem of finding Pareto optimal allo-
cations.
Complexity of Pareto optimality
Since a Pareto optimal allocation is guaranteed to exist, we
focus on computing such an allocation.
Proposition 3 Checking whether there exists an allocation
that is most preferred for each agent is NP-complete if we
allow indifferences in the preferences and even if each agent
has at most 4 acceptable outcome pairs.†
†Note that the problem is trivial if each agent has a unique most
preferred outcome.
Proof: We reduce from the following NP-complete prob-
lem.
Name: ExactCoverBy3Sets (X3C):
Instance: A pair (R, S ), where R is a set and S is a collec-
tion of subsets of R such that |R| = 3m for some positive
integer m and |s| = 3 for each s ∈ S and each element in R
appears three times in S .
Question: Is there a sub-collection S ′ ⊆ S that is a partition
of R?
Consider the setting instance in which N = R; H =
{h0, . . . , h|R|}; e(i) = hi for all i ∈ N. The preferences are
as follows.
j : {(e(k), i) : {i, j, k} ∈ S }, ( j, h j)
Then there exists an allocation in which each agent gets a
most preferred allocation if and only if there is a yes instance
of X3C. 
Proposition 4 Finding a Pareto optimal allocation is NP-
hard if there are indifferences in the preferences even if each
agent has at most 4 acceptable outcome pairs.
Proof: If there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to find
a Pareto optimal allocation, then it will return an allocation
that is most preferred for each agent if such an allocation
exists. 
Proposition 5 Checking whether a given allocation is
weakly Pareto optimal is coNP-complete even if preferences
are strict and even if each agent has at most 4 acceptable
outcome pairs.
Proof: Use the same proof as the previous one but consider
the endowment allocation. We can also make preferences
strict. 
ILP and Quadratic programming formulations
Although computing a Pareto optimal allocation is NP-hard,
one can still write an ILP to compute a maximum utility
and hence Pareto optimal allocation. Since agents only ex-
press ordinal preferences, one can suppose that each agent
has utility wi, j,k for receiving house h j and having a visitor k
in her own house hi.
max
∑
i, j,k∈N
xi, j,k · wi, j,k
xi, j,k ∈ {0, 1} for i, j, k ∈ N, and
xi,k,i = xi,i,k = xk,i,i = 0 for i, k ∈ N, i , k
For fixed i ∈ N,
∑
j,k∈N
xi, j,k = 1 for all j, k ∈ N,
For fixed j ∈ N,
∑
i,k∈N
xi, j,k = 1 for all i, k ∈ N,
For fixed k ∈ N,
∑
i, j∈N
xi, j,k = 1 for all i, j ∈ N,
where wi, j,k is a weighted value corresponding to the pref-
erence of agent i, receiving house h j and a visitor k in her
own house hi.
One can also write a quadratic program that is even more
compact.
Quadratic programming for maximum utility
max
∑
i, j∈N
xi, j · wi, j,k · x j,k
For fixed i ∈ N,
∑
j∈N
xi, j = 1 for all j ∈ N
For fixed j ∈ N,
∑
i∈N
xi, j = 1 for all i ∈ N
Responsive extension preferences
In certain scenarios, an agent may have underlying prefer-
ences %H
i
over houses and over tenants %N
i
. Her preferences
over the combinations of houses and tenants may depend
naturally on their underlying preferences. In particular, we
study the situation where the preferences are based on the
responsive set extension. We consider the responsive set ex-
tension that is a subset of responsive preferences that only
relates allocations when one allocation is unambiguously at
least as preferred as another. We say that agent i’s prefer-
ences %i over H × N are responsive if for any j, j ∈ N \ {i}
and h, h′ ∈ H,
(h %Hi h
′) ∧ ( j %Ni j
′) ⇐⇒ (h, j) %RSi (h
′
, j′).
We say that allocation p is RS-PO (Pareto optimal with
respect to the responsive set extension) if there exists no
other allocation q such that q(i) %RS
i
p(i) for all i ∈ N and
q(i) ≻RS
i
p(i) for some i ∈ N. Note that if an allocation is
not RS-PO, it admits an unambiguous improvement for the
agents.
We say that an allocation p is RS-IR (individually ratio-
nal with respect to the responsive set extension) if p(i) %RS
i
(hi, i). Our main result in this section is that there exists a
polynomial-time algorithm to compute an RS-IR and RS-
PO allocation.
Proposition 6 There exists a polynomial-time algorithm
that returns an individually rational and Pareto optimal al-
location with respect to responsive set extension.
First we outline a new problem called RS-AA. In this
problem an agent gets an acceptable allocation if it gets
some tenant agent that is one of the acceptable agents and
a house that is one of the acceptable houses.
Lemma 1 RS-AA can be solved in polynomial time.
Proof: In the algorithm we first force symmetry in multiple
ways. If an agent i does not have j as one of his acceptable
tenants, then hi cannot be one of j’s acceptable houses and
is removed from i’s list if i does not have house h j as one
of this acceptable houses, then i is removed from j’s accept-
able set of agents. After making the preferences symmetric
Input: Temporary Exchange Problem (N,H,%= (%1, . . . ,%n))
where %i is a responsive preference relations composed of %
N
i
and %Hi .
Output: RS-PO and RS-IR allocation.
1 Set %H
i
′
and %N
i
′
to indifference among all acceptable
(with respect to %H
i
and %N
i
) outcomes for all i ∈ N.
2 while %K
i
′
is not saturated for some i ∈ N for some
K ∈ {N,H} do
3 Choose such an i and choose to modify %K
i
′
by set-
ting to %K
i
′′
to %K
i
′
. %K
i
′′
are dichotomous prefer-
ences in which only those outcomes are acceptable
that are acceptable wrt to %K
i
′
except the last equiv-
alence class wrt %K
i
.
4 if RS-AA(N,H, (%′
−i
,%′′
i
)) then
5 %
′
i
←−%′′
i
6 else
7 Else label %K
i
′
as saturated.
8 return RS-AA(N,H,%).
Algorithm 1
in this way, we can simply check whether there is a per-
fect matching that matches each agent to one his acceptable
houses. We argue why this sufficient.
We will frame the problem in a perfect matching context.
Suppose there is a RS-AA problem with a set of agents N
and a set of houses H. Every agent i has two most preferred
sets, Hi ⊆ H, the preferred houses for the agent, and Ni ⊆ N,
the preferred tenants to their own house. A RS-AA solution
requires that an agent i is matched to a house h j owned by
agent j iff j finds i acceptable as a tenant and agent i consid-
ers house h j acceptable. Hence the setup of a matching prob-
lem over the bipartite graph with vertices N ⊎ H with edges
(i, h j) ∈ E existing iff agent i prefers house h j and agent
j prefers tenant i. Then a perfect matching on (N ⊎ H, E)
corresponds one-to-one with a solution of RS-AA. 
Lemma 1 is interesting because similar problems are NP-
complete for several matching settings in which a match has
three dimensions (Chan et al. 2016; Huzhang et al. 2017;
Ng and Hirschberg 1991). We now show that the
polynomial-time algorithm for RS-AA can be used as a sub-
routine to compute an RS-IR and RS-PO allocation. In or-
der to do so we present an adaptation and generalisation of
the Preference Refinement Algorithm (Aziz et al. 2013) that
is defined for hedonic coalition formation and that requires
complete preferences. For our problem we do not have com-
plete preferences but each preference relation has multidi-
mensional components—one involving a house and one in-
volving a tenant agent.
Lemma 2 If RS-AA runs in polynomial time for any alloca-
tion problem, then a RS-Pareto-Optimal allocation can be
computed in polynomial time.
Proof: An oracle to solve RS-AA can be used to compute
an RS-Pareto-Optimal and RS-IR allocation. The details are
specified in Algorithm 1.
We first start with the agent’s actual preferences. An ac-
ceptable allocation indeed exists: one in which each agent
stays where she is. We now start changing the agents’ pref-
erences, one component preference of one agent at a time.
For any given agent i, we see whether an acceptable alloca-
tion still exists if the least preferred acceptable elements of
the component preference are now unacceptable. If an al-
location exists, in that case those elements are permanently
marked as unacceptable and the algorithm proceeds. We do
so until no agent’s preference can be modified. At this point,
we know that a perfect allocation is Pareto optimal with re-
spect to the responsive preferences. 
Incentives
Up till now we have assumed that agents act sincerely and
report their truthful preferences. In this section, we ex-
plore scenarios where agents may misreport their prefer-
ences. We show that for the Temporary Exchange markets,
strategyproofness is incompatible with other desirable ax-
ioms.
Proposition 7 There exists no individually rational, Pareto
optimal, and strategyproof mechanism.
Proof: Consider the following instance of the problem.
• N = {0, 1, 2, 3}
• H = {h0, . . . , h3}
• e(i) = hi for all i ∈ {0, . . . , 3}
• The preferences are as follows.
1 : (h2, 2), (h2, 0), (h0, 2), (h0, 0), (h1, 1)
2 : (h3, 1), (h3, 3), (h1, 1), (h1, 3), (h2, 2)
3 : (h0, 2), (h0, 0), (h2, 2), (h2, 0), (h3, 3)
0 : (h1, 3), (h1, 1), (h3, 3), (h3, 1), (h0, 0)
The only two individually rational allocations are p and
q.
Allocation p:
1 : (h2, 2), (h2, 0), (h0, 2), (h0, 0), (h1, 1)
2 : (h3, 1), (h3, 3), (h1, 1), (h1, 3), (h2, 2)
3 : (h0, 2), (h0, 0), (h2, 2), (h2, 0), (h3, 3)
0 : (h1, 3), (h1, 1), (h3, 3), (h3, 1), (h0, 0)
Allocation q:
1 : (h2, 2), (h2, 0), (h0, 2), (h0, 0), (h1, 1)
2 : (h3, 1), (h3, 3), (h1, 1), (h1, 3), (h2, 2)
3 : (h0, 2), (h0, 0), (h2, 2), (h2, 0), (h3, 3)
0 : (h1, 3), (h1, 1), (h3, 3), (h3, 1), (h0, 0)
If the outcome under the original preferences is q, then
agent 2 can misreport as follows to obtain an outcome in
bold which is the only Pareto optimal and individually ratio-
nal allocation under the misreported preferences.
1 : (h2, 2), (h2, 0), (h0, 2), (h0, 0), (h1, 1)
2 : (h3, 3), (h2, 2)
3 : (h0, 2), (h0, 0), (h2, 2), (h2, 0), (h3, 3)
0 : (h1, 3), (h1, 1), (h3, 3), (h3, 1), (h0, 0)
In an individually rational allocation either 2 gets outcome
(h2, 2) or (h3, 3). If 2 gets outcome (h2, 2), then 1 gets out-
come (h0, 0) or (h1, 1). If 1 gets outcome (h1, 1), then the
outcome is e which is not Pareto optimal. If 1 gets outcome
(h0, 0), then 0 gets outcome (h1, 1). Then 3 gets outcome
(3, h3) which implies that 2 and 3 can swap each others’
houses to get a Pareto improvement. Thus in an individ-
ually rational allocation, 2 gets outcome (h3, 3). Hence 3
gets outcome (h2, 2). By Pareto optimality, 1 gets outcome
(h0, 0) and 0 gets (h1, 1). Under the allocation in bold, 2 gets
outcome (h3, 3) thereby violating strategyproofness.
We now suppose that the outcome of the original prefer-
ences is p. If the outcome is p, then 1 can misreport to obtain
an outcomes r or s in bold which are the only Pareto opti-
mal and individually rational allocations under the following
preferences.
Allocation r
1 : (h2, 2), (h1, 1)
2 : (h3, 1), (h3, 3), (h1, 1), (h1, 3), (h2, 2)
3 : (h0, 2), (h0, 0), (h2, 2), (h2, 0), (h3, 3)
0 : (h1, 3), (h1, 1), (h3, 3), (h3, 1), (h0, 0)
Allocation s
1 : (h2, 2), (h1, 1)
2 : (h3, 1), (h3, 3), (h1, 1), (h1, 3), (h2, 2)
3 : (h0, 2), (h0, 0), (h2, 2), (h2, 0), (h3, 3)
0 : (h1, 3), (h1, 1), (h3, 3), (h3, 1), (h0, 0)
Allocation r already provides a beneficial outcome for
agent 1 thereby violating strategyproofness. Suppose the
outcome is allocation s. In that case agent 3 can misreport
as follows to obtain the only Pareto optimal and individually
rational allocation which provides an improvement for agent
3 thereby violating strategyproofness.
1 : (h2, 2), (h1, 1)
2 : (h3, 1), (h3, 3), (h1, 1), (h1, 3), (h2, 2)
3 : (h0, 0), (h3, 3)
0 : (h1, 3), (h1, 1), (h3, 3), (h3, 1), (h0, 0)
This concludes the proof.

We say that a mechanism is core-consistent if it returns a
core stable allocation whenever a core stable allocation ex-
ists. The same argument can be used to prove that there ex-
ists no mechanism that is core-consistent and strategyproof.
Proposition 8 There exists no core-consistent and strate-
gyproof mechanism.
In the subsequent sections, we show negative results from
the previous sections can be circumvented if we consider
special structure on the preferences.
Predominant Preferences
In this section, we consider preference restrictions under
which we obtain positive axiomatic results.
House-predominant Preferences
A particularly restricted version of consistent preferences is
in which agents have strict underlying preferences over the
houses, care predominantly about the houses and use the
preferences over agents as a tie-breaker. We will refer to
these preferences as house-predominant preferences. The
core is non-empty for these preferences. This follows from
the fact that the TTC mechanism designed for basic housing
markets works for our setting. We first describe the TTC
mechanisms.
TTC: For a housing market with strict preferences, we
first construct the corresponding directed graphG(%) =
(V, E) where V = N ∪ H and E is specified as follows:
each house points to its owner and each agent points to
the most preferred house in the graph. Then, we start
from an agent and walk arbitrarily along the edges until
a cycle is completed. This cycle is removed fromG(%).
Within the removed cycle, each agent gets the house
he was pointing to. The graph G(%) is adjusted so that
the remaining agents point to the most preferred houses
among the remaining houses. The same step is repeated
until the graph is empty.
Proposition 9 For house-predominant preferences in which
agents have strict preferences over houses, the TTC rule is
core stable and Pareto optimal.
Proof: We first argue for core stability. When any agent i
is removed from the graph along with his allocated house
h, then h is a maximally preferred house for i from among
the remaining houses. Therefore i cannot be in a blocking
coalition with the agents remaining in the graph.
We now argue for Pareto optimality. Let S k be the kth
trading cycle that is removed from the trading cycle graph.
In any allocation x in which none of the agents are worse off
than in the allocation produced by TTC, these agents must
be allocated to houses in S 1. Taking this as the base case, it
follows by easy induction that in x, the agents of S k must be
allocated to houses in the kth trading cycle. Next, suppose
that i is a agent in S k for some k. Then no house in S k is
more preferred by i than the house that the TTC mechanism
assigns him to. It follows that no agent is strictly better off
in x than in the allocation produced by TTC. 
Proposition 10 For house-predominant preferences in
which agents have strict preferences over houses, the TTC
rule is strategyproof.
The argument is similar to the strategyproof argument for
TTC for the standard Shapley-Scarf market. An agent can-
not get a better house by misreporting. Suppose the agent
gets the same house but a different agent takes her house.
But this is not possible by the specification of TTC because
the agent gets the house she points to in a cycle.
Tenant-predominant Preferences
We can also turn around the problem completely so as to
consider a setting in which agents have strict underlying
preferences over other agents, care predominantly about the
tenants and use the preferences over houses as a tie-breaker.
We will refer to such preferences as “tenant-predominant
preferences.”
TTTC: For a housingmarket with strict preferences, we
first construct the corresponding directed graphG(%) =
(V, E) where V = N ∪ H and E is specified as follows:
each agent points to its house and each house points to
the agent most preferred by its owner. Then, we start
from an agent and walk arbitrarily along the edges until
a cycle is completed. This cycle is removed fromG(%).
Within the removed cycle, each house it taken by the
agent it was pointing to. The graph G(%) is adjusted
so that the remaining houses point to the agent most
preferred by its owner. The same step is repeated until
the graph is empty.
The following propositions can be proved for TTTC and
tenant-predominant preferences. The arguments for the
propositions above are very similar to those of TTC for
house-predominant preferences.
Proposition 11 For tenant-predominant preferences which
agents have strict preferences over other agents, the TTTC
mechanism is core stable and Pareto optimal.
Proposition 12 For tenant-predominant preferences which
agents have strict preferences over other agents, the TTTC
rule is strategyproof.
The same results also hold for “tenant-only preferences”
in which agents have strict preferences over tenants and do
not care about which house they get.
Conclusions
We considered a natural generalization of the Shapley-Scarf
housing market with ordinal preferences. Several posi-
tive axiomatic and computational results that hold for the
Shapley-Scarf housing market no longer hold for the tempo-
rary exchange market. On the other hand, we present some
positive algorithmic and axiomatic results when preferences
have more structure.
The problem can be extended in several ways. Typically
when exchanging holiday homes, it may be the case that the
exact duration of holidaysmay not coincide for the people in
the market. An extended model would allow for time win-
dows and having back to back bookings.
We presented an algorithm to compute an RS-PO alloca-
tion. One can also consider the core. A coalition S ⊆ N
RS-blocks an allocation p on N if there exists an allocation
q on S such that for all i ∈ S , it is the case that q(i) ∈ e(S )
and q(i) ≻RS
i
p(i). An allocation is RS core stable if it ad-
mits no RS blocking coalition. If all preferences over houses
are strict, then TTC returns an RS core stable outcome and
if all preferences over agents are strict, then TTTC returns
an RS core stable outcome. For weak preferences, the fol-
lowing problems appear to be interesting. Does an RS core
stable allocation always exist? What is the complexity of
computing such an allocation?
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